ABSTRACT In this paper, a novel secure data transmission scheme using chaotic compressed sensing, which has inherent encryption property without additional cost, is proposed based on a T -way Bernoulli shift chaotic system. In the proposed scheme, the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix (BCsM) is generated by the Bernoulli shift chaotic sequence. We prove that the BCsM meets the restricted isometry property with overwhelming probability, which guarantees good sensing performance. Compared with the state-of-the-art sensing matrices, such as the Gaussian sensing matrix, the BCsM has low complexity and is easily implemented in hardware. Meanwhile, we investigate the recovery performance, robustness, and security of the proposed scheme and show that the proposed scheme can ensure efficient secure data transmission against additive noise and malicious attacks. The proposed scheme is perfectly effective for large-scale, long-term data transmission with high energy efficiency and strong security.
I. INTRODUCTION
During recent decades, increasing efforts have been devoted to develop methods or schemes to enhance the efficiency and security of data transmission in communications. Investigations are moving along many directions, most remarkably compression and encryption. Nevertheless, this traditional signal process is based on the Shannon-Nyquist sampling theorem, wherein the sampling procedure is performed prior to further processing, such as compression and encryption. Hence, such a paradigm is subject to inefficiencies: redundant data, intensive energy consumption, and complex computation.
In recent years, compressed sensing (CS) [1] - [4] , which was introduced by Candés and Tao, has been used to unify sampling and compression into a single step provided that the original data (signals) have sparse or compressible features. Essentially, CS is a promising alternative to the conventional Shannon-Nyquist theorem, especially for data that exhibit high spectrum. Hence, CS has great potential in many applications that generate a vast amount of data after sampling because of the high Nyquist rate.
Luckily, the majority of practical data have sparsity features in the time or transform domain, for example, air humidity in the frequency domain and nature pictures in the discrete cosine transform domain. Therefore, we can make use of the sparsity of the original data by using CS instead of Shannon-Nyquist sampling before the data transmission process in the sending terminal of communication systems. CS has the innate superiority that encipherment occurs secretly in the sampling procedure, which means that CS-based framework can provide additional surprising and magical encryption properties without additional cost. In this veiled CS-based encryption scheme, the sensing matrix, which is generated by a private key possessed by the sender and receiver, acts as the compressed and encrypted operator at the sampling time.
This work is sponsored by [5] - [8] , and it has been studied from academic and practical perspectives. Specifically, the ideas in reference [9] have shown that CS-based encryption scheme can achieve perfect secrecy under some conditions. Up to now, CS-based encryption scheme has broadly been applied to various research fields, such as secure image transmission [10] , biological data [11] , wiretap channel in wireless sensor networks (WSN) [9] , and multiclass encryption [12] , [13] . A good overview of chaotic compressed sensing in the field of information safety can be found in [14] .
The construction of the sensing matrix plays a crucial role in the CS-based encryption scheme. However, the constant sensing matrix rapidly reduces the security because the invariable elements is known by both communication sides. Dynamic changes to the sensing matrix require frequent communication and additive storage cost, especially when for large-scale and long-term data transmission. Therefore, it is desirable to develop a proper sensing matrix to flawlessly sample data that can enhance the security of communications while reducing the cost.
Based on the properties of the chaotic system, the chaotic sequence is investigated to generate the sensing matrix for CS. The chaotic sequence, characterized as dependent on the initial seed, ergodicity, and random-like behavior, has been broadly used in the cryptosystems [15] , [16] , which aim to achieve trustworthy and confidential communications. There are many types of chaotic sequences [17] , which provide many options to choose. The chaotic sensing matrix is deterministic, has low storage requirements, and has easily facilitated hardware implementation. The performances of the Lorez and Chua chaotic sensing matrices for CS have been experimentally investigated in reference [18] . Similarly, the sampled Logistic chaotic sequence is designed to generate the sensing matrix [19] . By eliminating the transient time of the aforementioned chaotic sensing matrices, the Chebyshev chaotic sensing matrix established by [20] is verified to have analagous recovery performance to common random matrices. Hence, many applications have exploited the chaotic sensing matrix to achieve secure and efficient data transmissions in communications [21] - [23] .
In this paper, we present a novel secure data transmission scheme that utilizes chaotic compressed sensing based on the T -way Bernoulli shift chaotic system in communications, which has inherent encryption properties without additional cost. The Bernoulli chaotic sequence [24] has been widely used in code division multiple access [25] and encryption [26] , and reference [27] has analyzed the latent advantages compared to random watermarks. We elaborate the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix (BCsM) constructed by the Bernoulli chaotic sequence for the proposed scheme. The theoretical analysis confirms that the restricted isometry property of the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix is satisfied with probability close to one. The BCsM decreases the computational complexity and memory storage cost because the elements of BCsM are deterministic, resulting in several potential uses in many applications (such as direction of arrival (DOA) [28] , [29] ). Meanwhile, the Bernoulli shift system is a piecewise linear chaotic map, which means BCsM possesses a simple structure and entries, which facilitates the hardware implementation compared to random matrices. This Bernoulli shift chaotic CS-based encrypted scheme (BsCSE) is suitable for large-scale and long-term data transmission with high energy efficiency, long transmission period, and good security.
The aims of this paper are threefold: 1) We elaborate BsCSE in communications to make data transmission more efficient and secure, motivated by chaotic sensing matrix and CS-based encryption technique. The BCsM is used as the encrypted and compression operator at the sampling process before data transmission. 2) We theoretically analyze the statistical characteristics of the Bernoulli shift chaotic sequence and use the sequence to construct the BCsM for the BsCSE. Additionally, we explore the John-Lindstruss embedding property to prove that BCsM satisfies RIP with overwhelming probability, which guarantees exact recovery. The experiments show that the BCsM of BsCSE has good recovery quality, similar to random sensing matrices. 3) We investigate the security, robustness, and recovery performance of the proposed scheme. The computational complexity of unintentional or malicious attacks renders them infeasible in practice. Additionally, the BsCSE is certified to have inherent robustness against additive noise. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces CS, and Section III presents the Bernoulli shift chaotic CS-based encrypted scheme. In Section IV, the Bernoulli shift chaotic system is explained, and the statistical characteristics of the Bernoulli shift chaotic sequence are analyzed. In Section V, we design the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix for the proposed scheme and prove that the BCsM satisfies RIP with high probability. Then the security, robustness, and recovery performance of the proposed scheme are shown in Section VI. Section VII presents the conclusions.
II. THE BASICS OF COMPRESSED SENSING
The idea of compressed sensing is that original data (signal) 
where ℵ ℵ ℵ represents noise, and U U U ∈ R R R m×N is called the sensing matrix.
Fortunately, provided that we elaborate a sensing matrix U U U such that the crucial information in the original data is sampled and maintained by linear measurements during the down-sampling from the l p optimization algorithm
where 0 ≤ p < 1, or a greedy algorithm. It should be noted that the sensing matrix U U U must ensure exact recovery of x o x o x o from measurements y o y o y o . Many properties of sensing matrix U U U have been investigated to guarantee that the crucial information in the original data is sampled and maintained by the down-sampling, most notably the restricted isometry property (RIP) [1] , [30] , the mutual coherence [31] , the null space property [32] , and the l 1 constrained minimal singular values [33] . However, the RIP provides extremely explicit geometric explanations and can ensure exact recovery of
holds for all subsets with |S| ≤ d, S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N } and U U U S be m × |S| sub-matrix acquired from the corresponding columns of U U U according the indices in S. And the RIP has been further researched in [34] - [36] , which aim at finding the sufficient condition for the exact recovery through the l 1 optimization algorithm.
There are different ways to discover a stable sensing matrix (see, e.g., [1] - [3] , [37] , [38] ). The existing sensing matrices for CS can be classified into two categories in terms of their inner elements: random sensing matrices and deterministic sensing matrices [37] , [38] . References [1] - [3] have shown that random matrices, for example, the Gaussian random matrix, satisfy the RIP, which ensures exact recovery of
The BCsM, generated by the Bernoulli shift chaotic sequence, is specifically elaborated for BsCSE because it combines the merits of both classes.
III. BERNOULLI SHIFT CHAOTIC CS-BASED ENCRYPTED SCHEME
The traditional signal process is based on Shannon-Nyquist theory, namely, the original data are sampled first; then, the sampled data are compressed to reduce the redundancy. Finally, the compressed data are encrypted for security. The conventional data transmission is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
As seen in Fig. 1 , the encrypted data are transferred through the communication channel and are then finally decrypted by the legal receiver through a private key that is possessed by both the sender and the receiver. Nevertheless, this framework is subject to inefficiencies, such as undesirably redundant data, intensive energy consumption, and computational complexity. Additive noise generally exists in the transmission channel and directly affects the recovery quality. Compared with traditional secure data transmission, as shown in Fig. 2 , the Bernoulli shift chaotic CS-based encrypted scheme integrates compression and encryption into a single step during the sensing process with no additional cost. At the sending terminal, the compressive measurements, which are the encrypted and compressed version of the original data, are sampled directly by the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix. Then, at the receiving terminal, the receiver reconstructs the original data from the compressive measurements received through the communication channel with a reconstruction algorithm, for example, basis pursuit or a greedy algorithm. The chaotic sensing matrix is known to only the transmitter and authorized receiver with the security key. Without the private key to generate the BCsM, a receiver, eavesdropper or unintended listener cannot accurately reconstruct the data. Similar to the conventional data transmission, additive noise is also present in the transmission process.
A constant sensing matrix rapidly reduces the security because its elements are known by both communication sides. However, dynamically changing the sensing matrix requires frequent communication and additive storage cost, especially when for large-scale and long-term data transmission. The Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix with RIP is constructed based on the Bernoulli shift chaotic system to balance the storage cost and the security in the BsCSE. More precisely, the BCsM is designed by exploiting the T -way Bernoulli shift chaotic sequence whose initial condition w 0 and parameter T are used as the private key, denoted as K (T , w 0 ).
We prove that the BCsM satisfies the RIP in Section V. The BCsM has lower storage requirements than those of random sensing matrices. Moreover, we investigate the security, robustness, and recovery performance of the proposed scheme in Section VI, which indicates that the computational complexity of unintentional or malicious attacks renders them infeasible in practice. Additionally, the BsCSE is verified to show inherent robustness against additive noise. The experiments show that the BCsM of BsCSE, similar to random sensing matrices, has good recovery quality. The BsCSE is suitable for large-scale and long-term data transmission with high energy efficiency, transmission period, and security, especially for unstable channel data transmission, such as WSN and DOA.
IV. BERNOULLI SHIFT CHAOTIC SEQUENCE AND ITS STATISTICAL CHARACTERISTICS
We focus on the T (2 ≤ T ∈ N)-way Bernoulli shift system B T (w) recurrence formula, that is (5) which is one class of piecewise affine Markov maps. Consequently, a variational version of the Bernoulli system can be derived as
Then, a T -way Bernoulli shift sequence can be got through
T -way Bernoulli shift systems with T = 2, T = 5, and T = 8 are shown in Fig. 3 . If the initial condition w 0 of the Bernoulli shift chaotic sequence {w j } ∞ j=0 is an irrational number, we can obtain a non-periodic chaotic sequence. Because Eq. (7) is entirely certain and one known seed completely specifies a trajectory in the chaotic attractor domain, the transient time of a Bernoulli shift sequence with initial conditions in the interval [−0.5, 0.5] is equal to zero. The transient time is a significant concept in a chaotic system, and it represents the time elapsed during the trajectory from the seed to achieve a stable random process. For instance, the Logistic system's transient time is at least 29 iterations. Such iterations are not suitable for generating a sensing matrix. The invariant density α(w) of a Bernoulli shift chaotic system must first be calculated to analyze the properties of the Bernoulli chaotic sequence {w j } ∞ j=0 . 
According to [39] , the effect of one recurrence operator in a Bernoulli shift system on an arbitrary point α j (w) is defined by
where δ(•) is the Dirac delta function. Then, the t iterations α t (w) of a Bernoulli shift system with a normalized initial density α 0 (u) can be obtained as 
Using z = B T t (u) to substitute into Eq. (11), we obtain
Now, Eq. (12) can be evaluated using the integral as the number of the iterations t → ∞,
Hence, the invariant density α(w) of a Bernoulli shift system is 1, which can be observed experimentally, as depicted in Fig. 4 . Note that α(w) is same for any value of T , which means T -way Bernoulli shift system has a uniform invariant density α(w) = 1 in the interval [−0.5, 0.5]. Thus, T -way Bernoulli shift systems, for any T , can generate suitable chaotic sensing matrices. The invariant density of the Logistic map is known only when the value of the parameter ''biotic potential'' is equal to 4, which may restrict the application of the Logistic chaotic sensing matrix.
B. DISTRIBUTIONS
On the basis of the invariant density of the Bernoulli shift system, we can investigate the statistics of the Bernoulli shift sequence {w j } ∞ j=0 through the Bircheff individual ergodic theorem. VOLUME 6, 2018 over the interval I , defined as
where g(•) is mixing on an interval I with respect to an invariant density denoted by f (w) [20] . For a Bernoulli shift system, G(•) = B T (w), I = [−0.5, 0.5], and f (w) = α(w). Then, the mean of Bernoulli shift sequence {w j } ∞ j=0 can be easily obtained
In fact, due to the invariant density of the Bernoulli shift system, we can calculate the h th (h = 0, 1, . . .) order moments for {w j } ∞ j=0 with the above theorem.
where H = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Then, the variance D(W ) of the T -way Bernoulli shift sequence {w j } ∞ j=0 can be calculated as
C. STATISTICAL INDEPENDENCE
The correlation coefficients between the j th (j = 0, 1, 2, . . .) iteration w j and (j + k) th (k ≥ 1) iteration w j+k = B T k (w j ) of the {w j } ∞ j=0 can be calculated to investigate the independence of the Bernoulli sequence {w j } ∞ j=0 . Therefore, we need to compute the value of the joints moment function E(w
where h 0 and h 1 are the h th power of w i and w j+k . First, the joint distributions α w j w j+k (w, θ) should be investigated. Since w j+k can be derived from w j , i.e., w j+k = B T k (w j ), α w j w j+k (w, θ) is equal to joint distribution α w j B T k (w, θ), and we can obtain
Because α w j w j+k (w, θ) = 1 if and only if θ = B T k (w), we have
By virtue of Eqs. (18) and (20), we can easily get
Note that Eq. (7) is a piecewise linear function. Then, the integral of Eq. (21) can be replaced by the sum
Note that these intervals are not exactly continuous, but they are approximated as continuous because we take only irrational values in the integral [−0.5, 0.5] belonging to the same trajectory of the Bernoulli shift system. By taking h 0 = h 1 = 1 and combining with Eq. (22), we get
Moreover, by making connections between E(w
where
By combining Eqs. (23) and (24), it can be concluded that w j and w j+k are 1-order correlated, with small values of k and T ; however, the 1-order correlated coefficient converges towards a Dirac delta as k increases. The work in section IV-B shows that {w j } ∞ j=0 satisfies a distribution with mean zero and variance 1/12. Therefore, the sampled Bernoulli shift sequence {w j , w j+k , . . . , w j+(s−1)k }, denoted as G(T , k, w 0 ), can be viewed as an approximately independent and identically distributed (a.i.i.d.) sequence with a proper sampled distance k. In fact, we show that the Bernoulli shift sequence G(T , k, w 0 ), even for k = 1, can also be used to build the sensing matrix in Section VI.
V. BERNOULLI CHAOTIC SENSING MATRIX
In this section, we explain the construction of the BCsM U U U ∈ R R R m×N by exploiting the sequence G(T , k, w 0 ) with length m × N . Specifically, all entries of the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix are scaled by the factor 1/ √ mD(W ), where D(W ) is the variance of the Bernoulli chaotic sequence. Then, we can obtain BCsM column by column with G(T , k, w 0 ). Thus,
As illustrated in the previous section, BCsM is a pseudorandom chaotic matrix whose elements are extracted independently from a distribution with mean zero and variance √ 1/12m. Recent studies have used geometric explanations to illustrate that a random matrix or sub-random matrix satisfies RIP [2] . Specifically, a matrix whose elements are randomly extracted from a certain distribution satisfies the JohnsonLindenstrauss lemma, which is reported in reference [40] . R. Baraniuk et al. [41] have derived an improvement to this lemma, called the Johnson-Lindenstrauss embedding property. In this paper, we give a simple proof that the BCsM satisfies RIP, following the idea of R. Baraniuk.
Lemma 1 (Johnson-Lindenstrauss Embedding Property [41]): Given a random matrix U U U ∈ R R R m×N ,
with overwhelming probability
where cost represents a constant, and S is the set index with
The following theorem can be obtained on the basis of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss embedding property. Proof: On the basis of lemma 1, the BCsM will fail to satisfy Eq. (26) with probability
for each d-dimensional space R R R S . Note that there are N d such subspaces in R R R N ; therefore, the BCsM will diverge from the RIP with exponentially small probability
Then, for a stationary
we can obtain the exponent with the
In our case, it is better to choose a sufficiently small cost 1 to ensure that cost 2 > 0. Thus, the BCsM satisfies RIP with probability greater than 1 − 2 exp(−cost 2 · m). This concludes the proof. Note that in the above derivation, we do not need to specify the value of the parameter T or initial condition w 0 of the Bernoulli chaotic sequence. Thus, the seed value of T or w 0 does not violate the RIP of the BCsM as long as we choose an appropriate G (T , k, w 0 ) , i.e., the necessity prior to construct the sensing matrix. Due to the nature of the chaotic sequence, when the seed of T and w 0 changes, even by a small amount, the BCsM is entirely different. Therefore, T and w 0 can be viewed as the key K (T , w 0 ) for the BsCSE.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the security, robustness, and recovery performance of the Bernoulli shift chaotic CS-based encryption scheme. We first compare the recovery performance of the BCsM with that of the random sensing matrices. Then, the robustness and security performance of BsCSE are analyzed.
A. RECOVERY PERFORMANCE
This section evaluates the recovery performance of our scheme, in which the sensing matrix is based on the T -way Bernoulli shift sequence. Moreover, T and w 0 are referred to as the private key used to generate the BCsM. The original signal x o x o x o whose d entries are randomly drawn from N (0, 0.5) has length N = 500. To consider additive noise ℵ ℵ ℵ in the data transmission process depicted in Fig. 2 , we suppose that the noise in the simulation is Gaussian noise, and the initial signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) defined by 20 log 10 (
) is set to 39.
1) RECOVERY OF BCsM
First, we fix the sparsity d = 40 of x o x o x o , as shown in Fig. 5(a) . Moreover, we use the T -way Bernoulli shift sequence G(T , k, w 0 ) with T = 3, k = 4 and w 0 = 0.63568 1 to generate the BCsM, that is, the private key K (T , w 0 ) = (3, 0.63568). Then, we obtain the encrypted and compressed data (measurements) y o y o y o , as shown in Fig. 5(b) , by using BCsM with sizes 200 × 500 to sample x o x o x o . Finally, the basis pursuit, which is a typical l 1 optimization algorithm given in Eq. (2) , is utilized to recover original data. With the right key K , recovery signal x o x o x o * can be exactly recovered in Fig. 5(d) , and the corresponding recovery error is shown in Fig. 5(c) , and the corresponding SNR is 34.72. With the wrong private key, the recovery signal acts as a random signal, as illustrated in Fig. 5(e) , and the corresponding SNR is −4.457.
Moreover, the recovery results are compared with regard to different measurement sizes m of BCsM with different parameters T , initial seeds w 0 and sampled distances k. The results in Tab. 1 show that T and k do not affect recovery quality. Even when k = 1, the recovery quality of the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix is not substantially distorted.
The recovery quality is affected by only the measurement size m, which means we can directly construct the BCsM with the T -way Bernoulli shift sequence instead of the sampled version.
2) BCsM vs. RANDOM SENSING MATRIX
In the following, the BCsM is compared with the random sensing matrices to verify the recovery performance in the CS literature. Noise interference is also considered.
First, let d = 40; then, apply the BCsM-(k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ), Gaussian random matrix (GsM), database-friendly random matrix (DsM), and Bernoulli random matrix (BsM) separately to sample the original signal. The BCsM-(k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ) corresponds to Bernoulli sequences with sampled distances of k = 1, k = 2, and k = 3. The recovery performances of these matrices can be compared in detail through the basis pursuit algorithm. Fig. 6(a) compares the recovery errors, and the corresponding SNRs are illustrated in Fig. 6(b) . It should noted that additive noise influence the quality of the recovery after the number of measurements reaches a certain level since the measurement process increases the noise level.
Second, various sensing matrices with the same dimensions 250 × 500, including BCsM, BsM, DsM, and GsM, are used to measure the original signal with different sparsity d. Therefore, the exact recoveries, defined as
x o ≤ 0.5%, with sparsity d are shown in Fig. 7 . The above experiments illustrate that BCsM is comparable to random sensing matrices, i.e., the BsCSE has good signal recovery performance. In other words, the original signals can be effectively recovered from the encrypted compressed chaotic data in our proposed scheme.
B. ROBUSTNESS OF THE BsCSE 1) ROBUSTNESS TO ADDITIVE NOISE ATTACK
Noise always exists during data transmission. The noise can be generated by quantization or by the transmission channel. In the traditional secure data transmission scheme shown in Fig. 1 , even a tiny variation can lead to the loss of all information. However, the CS is proven to provide a new type of ''robust encryption'', where the encrypted signal is tolerant to additive noise.
Compared to the conventional secure data transmission scheme, this is an unusual encryption property. Therefore, due to this nature of the CS, the BsCSE, as shown in Fig. 2 , can reconstruct original data with high fidelity at the receiving terminal, even if there are eavesdroppers or intruders who want to attack the data communications by adding some additive noise. That is, the BsCSE has the ability to resist attacks up to a certain level. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 compare the recovery performance of the BCsM with some additive noise with the case of random matrices. Although, the recovery quality (recovery error, SNR, successful recovery) is distorted to some extent, there are no meaningful differences about recovery performances of these sensing matrices. However, in practice, a small degree of deterioration can be accepted in most of applications. Thus, BsCSE has the ability to defend against noise interference or attack.
2) ROBUSTNESS TO CROPPED ATTACK
Since the sensing matrix in CS framework considers each value of the original data to be equivalently important or unimportant, when a portion of the original signal is lost, the CS can still effectively reconstruct the data. Therefore, the CS has been applied in WSN and magnetic resonance imaging, where some packets of information are easily lost. Related applications can be found in [42] , [43] . Due to this characteristic of CS, the BsCSE can resist against cropped attacks and has the advantage of anti-package loss. This advantage would be advantageous in unstable channel data transmission, such as WSN, which suffers from natural interference and malicious attacks.
C. SECURITY PERFORMANCE 1) KEY SENSITIVITY
As described in Section V, the BCsM is designed based on a T -way Bernoulli chaotic sequence with key K (T , w 0 ). Consider the matrix U U U genenated by the right key K (T , w 0 ) and U U U generated by the wrong key K (T , w 0 ) . When the attacker with the wrong key K uses the l 1 recovery algorithm to reconstruct signal, the work in [6] has confirmed that the eavesdropper will recover an m−sparse solution rather than the original d−sparse signal with probability one.
To test the key sensitivity of BsCSE, the original 512×512 image of ''Goldhill'' shown in Fig. 8(a) is used. Fig. 8(b) is an encrypted vesion of ''Goldhill'', and Fig. 8(c) shows the ''Goldhill'' image decrypted by the BsCSE with the correct private key. Fig. 8(d .812, and −7.801 respectively. Obviously, the encrypted image cannot be decrypted correctly with the wrong private key K . Fig. 8 shows that the BsCSE is sensitive to private key K and can effectively ensure data security.
2) MALICIOUS ATTACK
Section VI-C.1 has illustrated that data cannot be reconstructed without the right key K . Nevertheless, an attacker can crack the private key in BsCSE by cracking the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix U U U . There are two feasible cracking approaches, namely, informed signal processing attack and brute force attack. The second method employs an exhaustive search over a ''grid'' of values for the sensing matrix. However, the cost of guessing the sensing matrix is on the order of O (N 1.3 ) or O(N 1.2 ) when using the l 1 magic or the truncated Newton method based on interior point method [44] . Moreover, the complexity of an informed signal processing attack using the sparsity and symmetry structure of CS is proved to be too expensive to be practical [7] .
However, the attacker may have other methods to attack the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix. Suppose N and d are known to the adversary, according to Eq. (1),
We utilize ℘ to denote a permutation of integers [1, · · · , N ]; then, one can obtain
Although the elements of x j and U ij can be cracked by some methods, a brute force search of the permutation operator is still required, and the complexity is
Note that when parameter N is large, it is impossible to crack the key due to the high cost and complexity. In reality, the adversary cannot have information about the elements of U U U T j and sparsity d. Therefore, the BsCSE can achieve strong secrecy for large-scale and long-term data transmission.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A novel secure data transmission scheme based on chaotic compressed sensing is presented in this paper. We specifically design the Bernoulli chaotic sensing matrix for the proposed scheme. Compared with existing constructions, the BCsM achieves good sensing performance and is easy to implement. Furthermore, through theoretical analysis and numerical experiments, the Bernoulli shift chaotic CS-based encryption scheme is verified to demonstrate good resistance to noise and attacks. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme is perfectly effective for large-scale and long-term data transmission with high energy efficiency, long transmission period, and strong security.
